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I. Introduction
A. The Source of the Debate
In the San Francisco Bay Area. a visit to Bayview/Hunters
Point or West Oakland quickly reveals a common threat fac-
ing many of our nation's industrial cities: the presence of
closed or underutilized contaminated industrial facilities
concentrated in low-income, minority communities.' These
sites, termed "brownfields" by the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA), represent significant problems in the form of
environmental degradation, and urban blight.2 The expensive
process of cleaning brownfields represents a huge barrier for
redeveloping and reusing urban land for the benefit of the
communities who live next to them.3 It is estimated that
brownfields will require up to a half billion dollars worth of
remediation expenditures.4 Estimates for the cost of envi-
ronmental remediation in general currently ranges upwards
of $1 trillion dollars.5 At least 37.000 industrial sites and
landfills must be cleaned up pursuant to regulations
imposed on facilities engaged in the treatment, storage, or
disposal of hazardous waste. This cleanup is expected to cost
several hundred billion dollars.6 Superfund sites and leaking
underground petroleum storage tanks require an additional
$218 billion in cleanup costs.7 At the threshold of this era of
& J.D.. Spnng 1996. University of California Hastings College of the
Law. BA. University of California at Los Angeles. 1992. Thanks to Professor
William Hutton. (See BackForty Newsletterof Conservation Law. Vol. 6. No.2(1996) for an additional treatment of this topic).
1. "LandscapC- Dwla ping a Rg onal Community-Baud Environmental Risk
Prftle for Ite San Franc.o Bay Arta, San Francisco State University Urban
Institute (March 1. 1996) at 2.
2. EvR'o. .A. P" rno.i Aszzmcy. 200-R-95-002. E o.-.M.
JusncF ST-o: Ext.cu O;R 12898 at 18 (1995).
3. Villlar W. Buzbee. Remenenng Repose: Voluntary Contamination
Cleanup Appro.ls. Inlcentive. and the co eIntmlnrb Labii i. 80 M,,. L REv.
35. 49-50 (1995).
4. Steve Lerer BmnrnfteM of Dreams. TtKr A:cm louRwn f Winter 1996,
at 16.
5. Susan E. Anderson & Alison Dinkins, Environmental Ckanup Costs:
Ordinary or Capital Ei'nditun?. 94 TAX NoTEsTcw.' 135-40 (July 13. 1994J(elec-
tronlc version).
6. M&alaneous Rn-wue I=. 1993: Heanns E*re iF-, Sufcomm. on Seect
Rnvenue hesurs of the Hc te Comm. on \Vay ard Mans. 103rd Cong. Ist Sess.
(1993) (statement of John W. Lee. Professor of Law. College of William &Maryl.
7. Id. The Issue of whether the -Petroleum, Exclusion: the specific
exclusion of petroleum from the definition of a 'hazardous substance" from
the Comprehensive Environmental Response. Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. sections 9601-9675 (1988). applies to leaking
underground petroleum storage ta'nks remains at issue. The Ninth Circuit
held In Wilshlre Vestwood Associates v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F2d
801 (9th Cir. 1989). that the petroleum exclusion applied to underground
storage tanks even when the petroleum contained EPA-listed hazardous
substances. Other courts have held that petroleum containing hazardous
substances falls out of the exclusion. See United States v. WVestem
Processing Co.. Inc.. 761 F Supp. 713 (W.D. Wash. 1991). However, the EPA
has designated oil contaminated soil as "solid waste" under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976. section 6972(a)}1{1B). In Zands v.
Imon. 779 F. Supp 1254. 1263 (1991). the Ninth Circuit held thatunderRCRA.
a private Individual can pursue a civil action for petroleum leakages that
result in solid waste.
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increasing environmental responsibility looms the
question of who will pay for the cleanup of such
properties, and in what manner.
Environmental legislation increasingly makes
industry liable for the cost of remediation.8 To miti-
gate the financial impact, industry favors an imme-
diate deduction of these costs and points to a long
string of legal precedent to support its position.9
The Internal Revenue Service, concerned with the
loss of revenue that will result if such deductions
are allowed, recently required the capitalization of
some remediation expenses in three technical
advice memoranda ('TAMs"). 0 Following a storm of
controversy and protest by taxpayers, the IRS issued
Revenue Ruling 94-38 in 1994 which resurrected the
case law reasoning that preceded the IRS technical
advice.' However, questions remain as to how far
the IRS wishes to stray from its previous holdings in
the TAMs. Efforts to reconcile the differing IRS posi-
tions have caused confusion over what environmen-
tal remediation expenses are deductible. This note
gives a general overview of the debate and under-
takes to resolve some of the confusion.
This note suggests that environmental advoca-
cy groups unhappy with a tax policy that allows
environmental remediation deductions should con-
centrate on non-tax policy arguments to change
current IRS practice. This suggestion stems from a
recognition that those parties in favor of a remedia-
tion deduction rest their arguments on long-stand-
ing tax policy. In addition, current legislative pro-
posals reflect a growing acceptance of the account-
ing principles which support an environmental
remediation deduction. 12 However, the U.S.
Supreme Court's opinion in INDOPCO, Inc. v.
CommisstonerI3 should raise concerns for those wish-
ing to increase the scope of what expenses may be
deductible. A strict interpretation of INDOPCO
could successfully limit the increasing applicability
of environmental remediation deductions. In any
case, the true source of this debate, a long history
of inadequate business practices in regards to the
environment,' 4 is a consideration that all policy-
8. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. sections 9601-9675, (1996); RCRA,
42 U.S.C, sections 6901-6992k (1996); and Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. sections 2601-2671 (1996).
9. Anderson & Dinkins, see supra note 5.
10. 26 I.R.C. section 61 10(j)(3) (West 1996) provides that a
technical advice memorandum may not be used or cited as
precedent. A TAM addresses only the concerns of the taxpayers
who requested it, on a case-by-case basis. The ruling in a TAM
will be modified or revoked by adoption of temporary or final reg-
ulations. However. TAMs are commonly used to gauge the IRS's
views on similar matters.
11. Private letter rulings, similar to TAMs, anse from audits
made by the IRS where a taxpayer desires the opinion of the National
Office. Unlike a TAM they reflect current policy and may be cited.
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makers should consider during each step in the
analysis of whether to deduct or capitalize environ-
mental remediation costs.
B. Statutory Background
The interested taxpayer must read several sec-
tions of the IRC together in order to determine the
deductibility of environmental remediation expens-
es as ordinary and necessary business repairs. First,
Internal Revenue Code section 162 provides for the
deduction of all "ordinary and necessary" business
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business.' 5 Second, repairs
are deductible as an ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expense under Section 1.162-4 of the Income
Tax Regulations.' 6 To be considered a repair under
the regulations, the following condi,:ions must be
satisfied: (1) the repair must be incidental; (2) the
cost must not materially add to the value of the
property; (3) the repair must not appreciably pro-
long the useful life of the property; and (4) the pur-
pose of the expenditure must keep the property in
efficient operating condition. 7
Third, Section 263(a)(1) of the Code provides
that no deduction shall be allowed for "lainy
amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent
improvements or betterments made to increase the
value of any property or estate."' 8 Fourth, Section
263(a)(2) states that no deduction shall be allowed
for "JaIny amount expended in restoring property or
in making good the exhaustion thereof for which an
allowance is or has been made."'19 Fif:h, Regulation
Sections 1.263(a)-I(a) and (b) set out a three-factor
test for determining whether an expenditure may be
deducted as a repair or capitalized as an improve-
ment. The test requires the capitalization of
amounts expended towards: (1) increasing the value
of the property; (2) substantially prolonging its use-
ful life; or (3) adapting the property to a new and dif-
ferent use.20 Finally, Section 263A provides that cer-
tain direct and indirect costs allocable to the pro-
duction activities of a trade or business are capital-
ized.2i "Production" is defined to include construc-
12. See infra pp. 25-26 and notes 175-177.
13. 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
14. See McGee Gnsby. Aircraft Manufacturers Say Environmental
Cleanup Costs Should Be Currently Deduaiblte, 94 TAX NoTEs TODAY 121-
13 (electronic version).
15. 26 I.R.C. sec. 162 (West 1996).
16. 26 C.F.R. sec. 1.162-4 (as amended in 1993).
17. Id.
18.26 i.R.C. sec. 263(a)(1) (West 1996).
19. 26 I.R.C. sec. 263(a)(2) (West 1996).
20.26 C.F.R. sec. 1.263(a)-i(a).(b) (1995).
21.26 I.R.C. sec. 263A (West 1988).
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tion. installing, building, manufacturing, develop-
ing, or improving, under Section 263A(g)(1).22
C. Parties Favoring Deductions
Most taxpayers, especially industry groups.
would prefer the option of having their environmen-
tal cleanup expenditures deducted as ordinary
expenditures under Section 162 .3 This preference
reflects the concern that capitalization results in
larger cleanup costs if the improvements are capi-
talized and amortized over the class life of the prop-
erty.24 Moreover, if the property is non-depreciable
land the remediation costs are recovered only when
it is sold.25 A deduction on the other hand. allows
taxpayers to time their remediation expenditures
for-a maximum tax benefit. For example, taxpayers
may offset their taxable net income in years they
incur deductible remediation costs.2 6
Some industry groups argue that allowing
such a deduction is a matter of economic survival
for a large number of their members. One particu-
larly aggressive industry group advocating remedi-
ation deductions is the petroleum marketing
industry.27 Their motivation stems in large part
from the EPAs 1998 compliance deadline for
upgrading underground storage tanks ("UST's) in
an effort to address the widespread urban environ-
mental problem of leaking USTs.28 The cleanup of
USTs, which are commonly found under gas service
stations, will soon cost hundreds of thousands of
station owners $15,000 to $20.000 per tank.2 Soil
cleanup will cost an additional $100.000 per ser-
vice station outlet.3 0
22.26 I.R.C. sec. 263Afg)(i) (West 1988).
23. Anderson & Dinkins, supra note 5.
24. Illustrative is a comparison of the present value of a
Si.O0O.000 current deduction against the value of SI.000.000 cap-
italized to real estate over 30 years assuming a 40% percent tax
rate (combined state and federal rates) and a 10% interest rate.
The latter formula results in a present value tax savings of $303.
263 while the former retains a present value tax savings of
$125.689. Philip ]. Holthouse & Kevin L Sherry. A Hazardous Ruling:
The Service Denies Deductibility of Asbestos Mitigation Costs. 20 1. REAL
EsT. TX'N 261 (Spnng 1993). at WL°2-3 (electronic version).
25. 26 IRC Sec. 168(i)(6) (West 1988) and 26 IRC Sec. 168(c)
(West 1988) classify the class lives of residential rental property
and nonresidential real property at 27-1/2 years and 39 years
respectively.
26. See 26 I.R.C. Section 446 (West 1988) which permits a
current tax deduction for ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or busi-
ness.
27. See IRS Says Environmental Reimediation Costs Must Be
Capitalized to Related Assets. 32 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) G-6. G-8 (Feb.
19, 1993).
28. OFFICE OF UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS. U.S. ENViRONMENTAL
PRro'EcToN AcFNC ENVIRONMENTAL FACT SHEET. EPKs LENDER LvAUwty
RULE FOR- UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKs (Sept 1995). The 1986
D. Parties Favoring Capitalization
As environmental remediation expenditures
soar, the increasing deduction of these costs has
captured the attention of the federal government.
as well as environmentalists. The IRS fears the huge
loss in tax revenues that will result if taxpayers, pri-
marily businesses facing large remediation expen-
ditures, are given environmental remediation
deductions. 3' Moreover. taxpayers may manipulate
their remediation efforts to correspond with large
net income tax years, which would lead to even
greater tax benefits, and a corresponding loss of
revenue to the government. Note that the tax code
bases the calculation of taxable income on the
books and records of the taxpayer 2
Environmental groups fear that a tax policy
which allows current environmental deductions
could undermine environmental policy.33 They argue
that an increase in favorable tax treatment for reme-
diation efforts will discourage sound environmental
practices in the present as industry learns to manip-
ulate the tax code for future benefit. 4 In other words.
an industry may use the adversity of environmental
regulations, forgo current environmentally sound
practices, and avail themselves of future write-offs.
Tax "breaks" for polluters are controversial. Its
soundness as a public policy raises concerns, chief
among them its potential incompatibility with the
regulations promulgated by other federal agencies.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response.
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA7} was
enacted in large part to shift the burden and cost of
cleanup from the public to the responsible par-
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act amended
Subchapter IX of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (Regulation of
Underground Storage Tanks) which now makes the owners and
operators of underground storage tanks stnctlyliable for the finan-
cial responsibility of corrective action against damage caused by
sudden and nonsudden accidental releases of petroleum. See 42
U.S.C. 6991b(c)(6) (West 1988).
29. 139 Co:,c. REc. E. 2382-04 (daily ed. Oct. 7. 1993) (state-
ment of Rep. Brewster).
30. Id.
31. Carol Conlura. IRS Reerses Course and Afhes Current
Deduaions for Cog [F Enironrental Cleanup In Re. RuL 94-38. 10 TAx
M.m. REAL Es. 1. 135 (Sept. 7.1994)(electronicversion) aVL'2.
32. 26 I.R.C. sect. 446(a) (West 1988). See also 26 I.R.C. sect.
461(h) (West 1988) allowing a fixed and determinable liability to
be deducted in the year of payment or accrual.
33. Heanng before tfe Sucomn. on SeL ct Revenue Measurs of te
House Comm. on Ways and Means. 103rd Cong. Ist Sess. (Sept.
19931(statement of Roy E. Hock on behalf of The Coalition to
Preserve the Current Deductibility of Environmental Remediation
Costs) (remarking environmental groups should not oppose, but
should support a tax policy favoring remediation deductions).
34. 1. Andrew Hoemer Tax Treatrent of Environmental Cleanup
Costs: An Environmental Vit. 94 TAx NoTs TOom 166-44 (Aug. 22.
1994) (electronic version).
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ties.35 It is ironic that a successful push by industry
to allow tax deductions would shift this burden back
to the public. 36
E. The Deduction as a Tool for Urban
Environmental Organizations
The above concerns have resulted in a line of
Tax Court decisions, IRS technical advice memoran-
da, and revenue rulings that leave many tax analysts
and environmentalists wondering about the future
of environmental remediation deductions. In a
recent attempt to clarify its position, the IRS, in
Revenue Ruling 94-38, indicated its support for the
use of tax deductions as a means of forwarding pn-
vate environmental remediation efforts.37 For those
interested in the remediation of contaminated
urban property, knowing whether the party respon-
sible for the remediation is entitled to a deduction
may help structure a transaction that ultimately
leaves the land cleaned up. For example, CERCLA
allows the courts to employ any equitable factor
that it considers appropriate when allocating
cleanup costs among potentially responsible par-
ties.3 8 A court could consider the existence of a
responsible party's favorable tax deduction when
balancing the equitable considerations present in a
multi-party cleanup situation. The same reasoning
would apply to private settlements and agreements.
II. The Legal Precedent for an Environmental
Remediatlon Tax Deduction
A. The Plainfield-Union Increase-in-Value Test
A long line of legal precedent supports the
allowance of deductions for environmental cleanup
expenses. A 1962 case, Plainfield-Union Water Co. v.
Commussioner,39 is the Tax Court precedent most
relied upon by taxpayers seeking such a deduction.
Plamnfield-Union articulated an "increase-in-value
test" which later served as the underpinning for the
reasoning behind Revenue Ruling 94-38.40 In
35. Michael J. Gergen, The Failed Promise of the "Polluter Pays'
Pnnciple: An Economic Analysis of Landowner Liability for Hazardous
Waste. 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 624. 641-44 (1994).
36. CERCLA supplements RCRA by establishing cleanup lia-
bility for potentially responsible parties. However, this is tem-
pered by the observation that Superfund is supported in part by
an environmental tax on industry. See 26 U.S.C. 9507 (1988) which
provides for the creation of a Hazardous Substance Superfund
supported by tax appropnations.
37. See generally Rev. Rul. 94-38,1994-I C.B. 35.
38. 42 U.S.C. sec. 9613(f)(I) (1988). See also United States v.
R.W. Meyer, Inc., 932 E2d 568, 572-73 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that
courts may consider totality of circumstances to balance equities.
39. 39 T.C. 333 (1962). nonacq. on other grounds. 1964-2 C.B. 8.
40. See Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-I C.B. 35.
Plainfield-Union, a public utility company was permit-
ted to deduct its expenses for the cleaning and
cement lining of water pipes to prevent a loss in the
pipes' carrying capacity.4 i The pipe, originally
installed in 1890 to carry well-water, was painted
internally with tar.4 2 Later, the company switched
from carrying well-water to river-water, which was
more acidic.43 As a result, iron-oxides built up
underneath the tar coating and diminished the car-
rying capacity of the pipe in a reaction called tuber-
culation.4 4 In 1960, the company cleaned and
cement-lined one-half of one percent of all the com-
pany's pipes then in service.45 Afterwards, the com-
pany deducted the work as an ordinary and neces-
sary repair. At the time, the pipes had an assigned
life of 100 years and had not yet fully depreciated.
The IRS disallowed the deduction, first contending
the repairs constituted a capital expenditure
because the utility company had materially
increased the value of the pipes.4 6
The Tax Court disagreed and held that the
cleaning and lining did not materially increase the
useful life, value, capacity or structural strength of
the pipes.4 7 In doing so, the court announced that
the test for determining whether an expenditure
materially enhances an asset would be an
increase-in-value test.4 8 This test would compare
the status of the asset prior to the condition
necessitating the expenditure with the status of
the asset after the expenditure.4 9 Using this test,
the court relected the IRS's claim that the repair
resulted in a material enhancement because, as
the court noted, any properly performed repair
adds value.50 First, the court reasoned that when
the after-repair value of an asset is compared with
its condition immediately preceding the time of
repair, it becomes too easy to claim that the repair
has added value to the assetYi The court noted
that the IRS position could conceivably require the
capitalization of nearly all environmental remedia-
tion expenditures.' 2
41. 39 T.C. 333 (1962).
42. Id. at 334.
43. Id. at 338.
44. Id. at 335.
45. Id. at 336 (noting that the company had not previously
cleaned or lined any of its tar painted pipe).
46. Id. at 338.
47. Id. at 337.
48. Id. at 338.
49. Id.
50 Id. at 338.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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Second, the court found that the cement lining
used to repair the pipes had merely restored the
pipes to their original condition before the tubercu-
lation; the taxpayer had merely engaged in the
deductible activity of repairing the pipe. The court
then defined a repair as follows:
A repair is an expenditure for the pur-
pose of keeping the property in an ordinarily
efficient operating condition. It does not add
to the value of the property, nor does it
appreciably prolong its life. It merely keeps
the property in an operation condition over
its probable useful life for the uses for which
it was acquired. Expenditures for that pur-
pose are distinguishable from those for
replacements.53
Third, the court found no material increase in
the capacity of the company's operations because
the pipes carried only as much water as they had
before the repairs.54 Fourth. the cement lining did
not render the pipes suitable for any new or addi-
tional use by the company."5 Fifth. the repairs on
such a small fraction of pipe did not comprise a
general plan of improvement in the court's interpre-
tation of the tax code.' 6 Finally, the cement lining
was only a temporary solution since the utility com-
pany expected it to wash away within a few years.57
The court noted that capital expenditures are gen-
erally considered to be more permanent in nature. 8
The Service next argued that capitalization was
appropriate because blame for the tuberculation
was attributable to the utility company's prior man-
agement decisions. 59 The court rejected this claim,
responding that the company could not have antic-
ipated the need for cement lining when it switched
to carrying river water6o The court made clear that
53. Id. at 337.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 338.
56. Id. at 339.
57. Id. at 337.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 340.
60. Id.
61. Id. (indeed. in 1954 Itaxpayerl merely cleaned the rele-
vant pipe, did not line it until 1957. and the tuberculation could
have been removed by periodic cleaning").
62. Id.
63. Anderson & Dinkins. supra note 5. Cf. Gnsby. supra note 14.
which discusses alternate lines of case law precedent supporting the
idea of a current environmental remediation deduction. One line
argues that the tax character of remediation expenditures should be
determined by reference to the nexus between the income produc-
ing activity which produced the contamination and current remedi-
an unusual, unexpected or sudden event was not
necessary to render a repair deductible. 6'
Management decisions, and external factors could
also lead to deductions 2
B. The Technical Advice Memoranda
Until recently, taxpayers could rely on the
Plainfleld-Union increase-in-value test when request-
ing deductions for repairs provided the expendi-
tures did not (1) extend property life; (2) increase
property value; or (3) render the property suitable
for a different use. 63 However, in the early 1990Ws.
the IRS increased taxpayer concern and sent indus-
try groups into a state of "near frenzy' over the
deductibility issue with the issuance of three tech-
nical advice memoranda (TAMs) focusing on envi-
ronmental cleanup costs. 4
1. Capitalization o[ Asbestos Removal
In the first TAM, the IRS concluded that
asbestos removal costs incurred by a manufacturing
firm should be charged to its capital account and not
deducted.65 The taxpayer had deducted the costs of
removing and replacing asbestos insulation in its
paper manufacturing equipment in response to new
Occupational Health and Safety Act regulations: The
taxpayer, relying on the Plainfleld-Union 'increase-in-
value test: argued that the replacement of the
asbestos with alternate insulation merely restored
the property to its pre-hazard condition and did not
increase the value of the operation.66
The IRS rejected the taxpayers claim, concluding
the removal and replacement expenditures increased
the property's value and constituted a capital expen-
diture under 1.263(a)-l(b).6 7 The IRS formulated a
test. substantially different from the PlnJ ld-Union
test, that focused on the value of the property after
the remediation expenditure.P The IRS took into
al expense. Under this 'tax benefit rule the court reiews pnor year
income-producing activity, such as operating a manufacturing facili-
ty, to determine if the operation of the facility could have lead to a
tax benefit (for example, an environmental remediation deduction).
If the taxpayer could have recieved a tax benefit due to prior year
income-produong activity but did not the taxpayer may be owed a
current deduction. The view that the tax benefit accrued to the IRS.
not the taxpayeg lustifies the rule. The rulewould then grantthetax-
payer a current environmental remediation deduction because the
current remedial expenses are the result of the exct activities that
caused the earlier Income. This line of reasoning is intriguing but
neither the IRS nor Congress have widely used it recently to justify
increasing the scope of remedial deductions.
64. 2 52tD N.Y.U. lImmum on Ft-ci, TAxvon 31.10.
31.981111dl (1994).
65. TecAdv. Mem. 92-40.004 (lune 29. 1992).
66 Id.
67. Id. The improvement also fell within the definition of
'produce In 26 I.R.C. Section 263A(g)l().
68. Id.
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account intangible benefits, such as a reduction in
health nsks, greater worker safety, and a reduced risk
of civil liability, that it believed increased the proper-
ty's value.69 The IRS also viewed the increased mar-
ketability of the property in its cleansed state as
requiring capitalization. 70 One commentator analo-
gized the IRS's advice to requinng the capitalization
of a paint job since it too increases.the marketability
of an asset?i Tax analysts strongly criticized the IRS
for creating an apparent tax disincentive for taxpay-
ers who wish to completely remove asbestos and
other hazardous material from their property.72
The IRS's motivation to question its longstand-
ing policy of allowing remediation deductions may
have been prompted by the U.S. Supreme Court's
ruling in INDOPCO v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue73
which was delivered in the same year as the
asbestos-TAM.7 4 In INDOPCO, the Court held that
certain investment banking fees and expenses sur-
rounding a merger-acquisition did not qualify as
ordinary and necessary business deductions under
Section 162(a) of the I.R.C.7 5 An accounting of the
intangible future benefits that followed from the
merger resulted in the capitalization of the costs at
issue.7 6 While the Court would not allow a mere inci-
dental future benefit to disallow a deduction, it
noted that future benefits are "undeniably important
in determining whether the appropriate tax treat-
ment is immediate deduction or capitalization."77
The Court paid special attention to the language of
Section 263(a)(1) which requires an inquiry into the
"duration and extent of the benefits" that permanent
improvements and betterments grant to the taxpay-
er.78 The court's concern that a proper matching of
current income and expense attributable to that
income occur under the Code caused it to focus on
the future benefits created by the remedial activity7 9
The Court believed that this "matching principle"
results in a more accurate reflection of net income
for tax purposes.8 0 The Court's application of the
future-benefits test demonstrated its concern over
the broadening scope of deductible expenses.
The Court also wanted to narrow the applicabil-
ity of the ordinary and necessary business deduction:
The notion that deductions are exceptions to
the norm of capitalization finds support in
various aspects of the Code. Deductions are
specifically enumerated and thus are subject
to disallowance in favor of capitalization ..
Nondeductible capital expenditures, by con-
trast, are not exhaustively enumerated in the
Code ... For these reasons, deductions are
strictly construed and allowed only "as there
is a clear provision therefor."8 1
When considered in this light, the IRS determi-
nation in the TAM that the cost of removing the
asbestos should be charged to the taxpayer's capi-
tal account is more understandable. Subsequent
IRS advice justifies the capitalization of remedial
expenses by focusing on the existence of intangible
substantial future benefits.
2. Capitalization of Soil Remediation Costs
In the second TAM, the IRS ruled that the tax-
payer's removal of PCBs from its soil was a capital
expenditure. 82 For years the taxpayer dumped PCBs,
commonly used for lubrication, into earthen pits
surrounding its oil pipelines.8 3 The EPA, under CER-
CLA,8 4 eventually sued the taxpayer to conduct a
cleanup, conduct annual audits, and provide for
ongoing remedial activities beyond those required
for the cleanup at hand.8 5 The taxpayer, asserting
the Plainfield-Union test, deducted its expenditures
for the soil cleanup.8 6
In rejecting the taxpayer's claim for a deduction,
the IRS distinguished the facts in Plainfield-Union that
justified the Tax Court's application of the increase-
in-value test. Unlike the minor repairs made in
Plainfield-Union, the cleanup costs incurred here indi-
cated substantial improvements to the land. The
PCBs had accumulated over many years, no regular
maintenance plan was used, and now the taxpayer
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Philip J. Holthouse & Beniamin H. Shiao. Deductibility of
To=c Abatement Costs: The News Improves, 22 1. REAL Est. TAX'N 35 (Fall
1994), at WL-7 (electronic version).
72. Id.
73. 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
74. Coniura. supra note 31 at WL*7.
75. 503 U.S. at 90.
76. Id. at 89 (finding a reduction of expenses surrounding
proxy battles and derivative suits that resulted from the transfor-
mation from a publicly traded to a pnvately held corporation was
a substantial intangible future benefit).
77. Id. at 87.
78. Id. at 88.
79. Id. at 83-84.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 84 (alteration in origlnal)(citations omitted)(quot-
ing New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435. at 440),
82. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992),
83. Id.
84.42 U.S.C. sections 9601-9675 (1988).
85. Tech. Ad. Mem. 93-15-004, at WL*2-3.
86. Id. at 7
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was engaging in a large scale systematic plan to per-
manently improve its property.87 The IRS applied the
"general plan of rehabilitation doctrine" in light of
these facts and circumstances.88 This judicially craft-
ed doctrine requires the capitalization of repair
expenditures when they occur in conjunction with
capital expenditures meant to improve or prolong
the life of an asset as part of a general plan.89 To sup-
port this application, the IRS referred to Wolfsen Land
& Cattle Co. v. Commtissone9 0 where the general plan of
rehabilitation doctnne required the taxpayer to cap-
italize the costs of dredging his ranch's irrigation
ditches. For a decade the taxpayer had forgone
annual ditch maintenance which ultimately required
a massive dredging operation which required the
removal of a significant amount of accumulated silt
91 The court found that these dredging expenditures
would have a significant impact on the value of the
property.9 2 The court concluded that these expendi-
tures, considering their magnitude, were not merely
incidental. Rather, the taxpayer's plan to rehabilitate
all the ranch's ditches was more in the nature of a
systematic capital 'replacement' that requires capi-
talization under 263A_93
Similarly, the IRS blamed the taxpayer's lack of
a regular maintenance program in the PCB TAM for
the denial of an IRC Section 162 ordinary and nec-
essary business expense deduction. 94 The IRS noted
that disposal of the PCBs on a periodic basis would
have obviated the need for such an extraordinary
cleanup.95-Citing Wolfen, the IRS substituted the
general plan of rehabilitation doctrine instead of
the Plainfield-Union test by looking to the extensive
nature of the taxpayer's remediation efforts in
cleaning the PCBs.96
3. Capitalization of Costs Surrounding a Change in Use
The third TAM focusing on remediation expen-
ditures dealt. with the capitalization of costs sur-
rounding the removal and encapsulation of
87. id. at 5-6.
88. See Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 816
(1971), crt. denied. 405 U.S. 989 (1972) where taxpayer's expenditures
towards repair of a natural gasline were coupled with expenditures
which also extended the useful life of the underlying asset and dou-
bled its operating pressure thus requirng capitalization of all costs.
89. Tech. Adv. Mer. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17. 1992).
90. 72 T.C. I (1979).
91. Id. at 8.
92. Id. at 17.
93. Id. at 18.
94. However the cleanup costs were amortized to the taxpay-
er's facilities, and were depreciable over the useful life of the fadli-
ties. This fact was blacked out when the TAM was released, as report-
ed in: Environmental Cleanup Costs Addressed At 'l4o ABA Tax Section
Meetings. 93 TAx NoTsTObe 165-7 (Aug. 9. 1993](electronicversion).
95. Id. at WL °12.
asbestos insulation. The costs were incurred subse-
quent to the taxpayer's conversion of a former boil-
er house into garage and office space.97 The taxpay-
er asserted that the expenses incurred did not
increase the value of the property.93 The IRS dis-
agreed and capitalized the expenditure for removal
of the asbestos, noting that its removal increased
the property's value 9 Moreover, the IRS linked the
asbestos removal to the conversion of the boiler
house and found the removal was part of a conver-
sion to a new and different use of the property. In
this manner, the IRS avoided application of the
Plamnfleld-Union test.100 However. the mere encapsula-
tion of the asbestos-pipe did not result in an
increase in the property's value. The IRS reasoned
the expenditures were deductible because they
reduced, but did not eliminate, the threat of air-
borne asbestos fibers.i0i
Opposition to all three TAMs coalesced rapidly.
Petroleum marketers, facing large soil and ground-
water remediation expenditures, were especially
concerned with the potential impact of the PCB
TAM. 102 Real estate developers, worried by the
impact of these TAMs on their urban redevelopment
plans, also comprised an influential group of con-
cemed taxpayers.iO 3 The third TAM was also criti-
cized for dissuading taxpayers from engaging in
more comprehensive repairs to remove outright
harmful substances rather than merely treating and
monitoring such substances on-site.i04
In the face of widespread protest, the IRS
began to recdnsider jts positionOs By 1993. in the
absence of Treasury department action to resolve
the uncertainty caused by the TAMs, Congress
began searching for a legislative solution. Some
members of Congress, under pressure to lower the
deficit and disallow "tax breaks- for business, felt
one possible solution would be a more stringent
capitalization requirement for environmental
remediation.106
96. Conlura. supra note 31, at WL*9.
97. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-i 10-02 (Nov. 19.1993).
98. Id.
99. l.
100. Coniura. supra note 31. at WL*9.
101. Tech. Adv. Mer. 94-I10-02supra note 97.
102. N.Y.U. it surnn supra note 64.
103. O'rnes of Real Estate Await Aditi nal Guidance on Tax
Treatment of Enrmronmnental Clkanup Costs. I I TAx McmT. REAL Esr. I. t I
(electronic version).
104. Holthouse & Shiao. supra note 71. at WVL7.
105. Conlura. supra note 31. at WL" 5.
106. Descnptiin of Misce ilneaus Revenue Proposas: Sc eduW for
Heanngs Before Ift Suftornm. on Selct Revenue Measures of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means. 103rd Cong.. Ist Sess. (1993).
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C. Industry Response to the TAMs
In 1993, industry representatives, such as the
Coalition to Preserve the Current Deductibility of
Environmental Remediation Costs, 0 7 appeared
before the House Ways and Means Select Revenue
Measures Committee to testify that a capitalization
requirement for environmental remediation would
change tax law for the worse.108 Capitalization, they
argued, would discourage efficient cleanup efforts
and run contrary to long-standing tax policy. The tax
counsel for Shell Oil Company claimed that "99.9%
of practitioners" urged the application of the
Plainfield-Unon "increase-in-value test."1°9
The petroleum industry also endorsed legisla-
tion in the House that would allow deductions for
business expenditures incurred under CERCLA
mandated cleanup of petroleum-contaminated soil
and groundwater."10 Ultimately, Treasury Secretary
Lloyd Bentsen, at the urging of a bipartisan majon-
ty of both the Senate Finance Committee and the
House Ways and Means Committee, launched a
task force to resolve the confusion.III The IRS, real-
izing its position was inconsistent with that of the
business community and with the Clinton
Administration's evolving stance on environmental
cleanup, issued Revenue Ruling 94-38 which articu-
lated a position contrasting sharply with the IRS
opinion expressed in the previous three TAMs.
III. Revenue Ruling 94-38: The IRS Adopts the
Plainfield-Union Test
The IRS finally provided guidance regarding the
dedl, tibility of environmental cleanup costs in
Re iue Ruling 94-38. In that ruling, the IRS
alf, ad a current business deduction for soil reme-
diation and groundwater treatment costs.' 2 The
corporation purchased the land in an uncontami-
nated state in 1970 and subsequently operated a
manufacturing plant on the property. By 1993, the
soil and groundwater beneath the property was
contaminated by the onsite burial of hazardous
waste discharged by the plant." 3 Later, in compli-
107. Heanngs before the Subcomm.,O3rd Cong. 1st Sess.
(Sept. 1993) Members of the coalition include: CENEX.
Farmland Industries. Technitrol, Kalama Chemical., see supra
note 33.
108. Id.
109. Treasury to Address Additional Environmental Cleanup issues,
CCH TAX DAY: Federal, June 9. 1994. at WL*2 (electronic version).
110. 139 CONG. REc. E2382-04 (1993) supra note 29.
i1I. Holthouse & Shiao. supra note 63. at WL17.
112. Rev. Rul. 94-38, i C.B. 35.
113. Id.
!14. Id.
ance with federal and state environmental require-
ments, the company excavated the contaminated
soil and replaced it with 'clean' soil. A groundwater
treatment facility, which included wells, pipes,
pumps and groundwater monitoring equipment
were also installed. 114 The treatment facilities are
expected to operate until the year 2005,"15
In its analysis, the IRS recognized first that
although a particular expense may occur only once
in the lifetime of a business, the expenditure may
still qualify as an ordinary and necessary business
expense deduction under Section 162.116 To qualify,
the expenditure must be: 1) appropriate and helpful
in carrying on the business; 2) commonly and fre-
quently incurred in the taxpayer's type of industry;
and 3) not a capital expenditure."17 To lustify this
rule the Service focused on the extent to which the
remediation expenditure created a significant
future benefit. 18 To determine whether the expen-
diture creates a significant future benefit, the
Service followed the Plainfield-Union test to deter-
mine whether the post-contamination value of the
property had increased in value after the expendi-
ture when compared to its pre-contamination
value.ii 9 The Service noted that an accurate com-
parison could be drawn since the land was uncont-
aminated when the taxpayer purchased it. 120
Second, the Service found that neither the
groundwater treatment nor soil remediation costs
increased the value of the taxpayer's property.12
Rather, "X [the taxpayerl has merely restored its soil
and groundwater to their approxirrate condition
before they were contaminated by X's manufactur-
ing operations.i 22 Third, the Service concluded the
expenditure would not result in a p-olongation of
the property's useful life. 23 The Service reasoned
that when a repair leads to no permanent improve-
ment, and merely restores a property to its original
condition, capitalization is not required under IRC
Section 263(a)(2). 124 Therefore, the Plainfield-Union
test required a deduction for these expenditures as
an ordinary and necessary business expense under
IRC section 162.125
115. Id.
116. [d. citing Welch v. Helvering. 290 U.S. 11 (1933),
117. Id.
118. Id. at 36.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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The ruling also narrowly interprets the Supreme
Court's INDOPCO future-benefits test the IRS
adopted in the first asbestos-TAM. While the IRS
acknowledged the test when it noted that consider-
ation of significant future benefits is important, it
departed from INDOPCO by not accounting in its
valuation of the property for future intangible bene-
fits such as improved worker health and safety,
reduced liability, and the property's increased mar-
ketability.126 It remains unclear how this IRS demar-
cation of the INDOPCO test will apply to other envi-
ronmental remediation efforts.
Not all the remediation expense incurred by
the taxpayer was deductible. The IRS required the
capitalization of the cost of building and installing
the groundwater treatment facility.127 The ground-
water facility provided a future benefit to the tax-
payer because its useful life extended beyond the
taxable year in which it was constructed. 128 The
resulting future benefit to the taxpayer requires
capitalization under section 263A. 129
By not allowing a complete deduction for the
costs incurred in building, installing, and operating
the groundwater waste management 'system, the
ruling demonstrates the ongoing and prolonged
tug-of-war over what must be capitalized and what
may be deducted. However, the explicit adoption of
the Plainfteld-Union test in Revenue Ruling 94-38 may
provide a clearer understanding of where the
Service is headed in regards to deduction
allowances. For those who viewthe tax code as an
underutilized tool for environmental remediation,
Revenue Ruling 94-38 a step in the right direction.
However, the alternate conclusions contained with-
in the TAMs discussed above still pose significant
questions.
IV. Applicability of the TAMs after Rev. RuL 94-38
Taxpayers should note that the IRS adoption of
the Plainfteld-Union test in Revenue Ruling 94-38
does not necessarily require its wholesale applica-
tion to the fact patterns in the TAMs discussed
above. However, some reasonable conclusions may
be drawn. Under the Plamnineld-Unton test. the return
of soil to its original state does not result in an
increase in the value of the property when com-
pared with the value of the property prior to its con-
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. The Service also notes the construction of the facil-
ity falls within the definition of -production" under 26 I.R.C.
263A(g)(1) (West 1988).
130. Conjura. supra note 31. atWL*9-10.
tamination. This result is inconsistent with the IRS
advice given previously in the second TAM.
Therefore. the taxpayer should have been allowed a
deduction for the costs incurred in the removal of
PCBs from the property.'"
A. Depreciability
The questions raised by the first and third
TAMs, whether deductions are allowed for the
removal of asbestos from buildings, or the replace-
ment of equipment containing asbestos, cannot be
answered with certainty. In Revenue Ruling 94-38
the taxpayer restored only non-depreciable proper-
ty, so arguably deductions should be limited only to
cases involving non-depreciable property, such as
unimproved land. 131 However. in Plainfield-Union the
court allowed a deduction for pipe repairs that had
not yet been fully depreciated. 32 Revenue Ruling
94-38 did not resolve this inconsistency. In that rul-
ing, the IRS accepted the Plainfteld-Union test without
distinguishing between depreciable and non-depre-
ciable property.33
A related issue is how to determine which tan-
gible property used in the process of remediation
will be considered depreciable property, and non-
deductible. Examples include the plastic liners used
in groundwater treatment facilities, and certain
equipment and fixtures necessary to remediate
buildings and equipment. Taxpayers should capital-
ize such property on the grounds that the expendi-
tures have restored a depreciation allowance for the
unrepaired property so the costs must be recovered
over the useful life of the asset.34 To capitalize, how-
ever. may sometimes require a difficult separation of
certain tangible assets from the remediation process
itself. Moreover, as noted above, it remains unclear
whether the IRS wishes to distinguish between
depreciable and non-depreciable property.135
B. Acquisition of Contaminated Property
The IRS should not avoid applying the Pain? eld-
Union test to all fact patterns involving the acquisi-
tion of contaminated property. 36 If the purchaser
has no knowledge of the latent defect, a deduction
should be allowed after the contamination is dis-
covered. Adoption of the Planjfeld-Union test would
facilitate brownfields restoration by granting an
incentive to prospective purchasers and developers
131. !d.
132. 39 T.C. 333 at 338 n. 7.
133. Conlura. supra note 31. at V/L8.
134. CCH TA.x DAY- Federal.August8. 1995 (electronicversion).
135. lid.
136. Conlura. supra note 24. at V19-10.
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of vacant, urban land. Relieving potential pur-
chasers of some of the weight of uncertain liability
would encourage private redevelopment of urban
land.' 37 In contrast, the acquisition of contaminated
land, with knowledge of its contamination, should
not be accorded such treatment. The IRS generally
considers the payment of contingent liabilities
related to acquired property a capital expenditure,
rather than an ordinary and necessary expense.
In David R. Webb, 138 the Tax Court held that con-
tingent liability payments should be considered
capital expenditures regardless of how the previ-
ous owner would have treated them. Contingent
environmental liabilities should also be capital-
ized because the purchase of property with a pre-
existing liability generally involves a discounted
purchase price.' 39 Furthermore, in a recently
issued TAM, the IRS limited the application of
Revenue Ruling 94-38 to taxpayers who acquire
'clean' property and then contaminate it them-
selves in the course of everyday business opera-
tions.140 This ruling implies the IRS will disallow a
deduction for land acquired in an already contam-
inated state. This TAM was later revoked, but its
issuance is a significant demonstration of how
restrictively the IRS may interpret the principles
encompassed in Revenue Ruling 94-38.
1. Recent IRS Advice
In TAM 9541005, released nearly two years after
Revenue Ruling 94-38, the IRS concluded the tax-
payer would not receive a deduction for soil remedi-
ation costs on land acquired in a contaminated con-
dition.i 4i The taxpayer made a charitable contribu-
tion of land to a local county. 42 The taxpayer initial-
ly used the land as a farm, but for the fifteen years
preceding the contribution the land became a dis-
posal site for chemical wastes and coke oven by-
products. 43 The county, planning to convert the land
to a recreational park, discovered the contamination
and conveyed the land back to the taxpayer for one
137. Robert S. Berger. et al. Recycling Industnal Sites in Ene
County: Meeting the Challenge of Brownfield Redevelopment, 3 Buni. ENVfL
L. 1. 69, WL*54 (1995).
138. 77 T.C. I 134 (1981). affd 708 E2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1993).
139. Id.
140. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13. 1995)
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id,
dollar.144 The following year, the EPA conducted tests
which revealed the soil was contaminated with
enough hazardous waste to qualify the land as a
Superfund site under CERCLA. 145 The taxpayer was
held liable for response costs under CERCLA.146
The taxpayer entered into a consent order with
the EPA to complete a "Remedial Investigation and
Feasibility Study" to determine the extent of reme-
dial activity to be performed.' 47 The taxpayer also
requested advice from the IRS regarding the
deductibility of its remediation costs, including fees
paid to an environmental consulting and engineer-
ing firm, as well as the legal expenses incurred in
drafting the consent order.'48 The taxpayer relied on
Revenue Ruling 94-38 to support its view that all
such costs are deductible as ordinary and necessary
business expenses. 49
In response, the IRS announced that Revenue
Ruling 94-38 does not apply to the factual situation
in TAM 9541005. In the TAM, the taxpayer technical-
ly acquired the land in an already contaminated
state.1 50 In Revenue Ruling 94-38, the taxpayer pur-
chased the land free of contamination. ' According
to the IRS, the former factual scenario does not
allow for an application of the Plainfield-Union test, In
Plainfield-Uion, the taxpayer's expenditures did not
increase the value, useful life, or s:rength of the
asset in question, but merely restored it to its orig-
inal capacity." 2 The IRS interpretation of this
"restoration principle" makes it inapplicable to the
purchase of already contaminated land.'5 "The
restoration principle envisions that the taxpayer
acquire the property in clean condition, contami-
nate the property in the course of its everyday busi-
ness operations, and incur costs to restore the
property to its condition at the time the taxpayer
acquired the property."154
The interpretation of Revenue Ruling 94-38 in
TAM 9541005 is narrow. It appears especially rigid
when considering the taxpayer was merely reacquir-
ing the property charitably given to the county."'
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. id.
154. Id.
155. In Rev. Rul. 95-74. 1995-46 C.B. 6 the IRS allowed a
remediation deduction for land acquired in a 26 I.R.C. sec, 351
(West 1988) exchange. The IRS reasoned the congressional Intent
of sec. 351 to facilitate tax free corporate restructuring required a
remedial deduction. The deduction was granted to the transferee
iust as if the sec 351 transaction had never occurred and it was
the original title holder who requested the dedLction. The signif-
icance of this ruling to other fact patterns remains unclear,
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After receiving criticism of its advice, the IRS
revoked TAM 9541005 and in a new TAM" 6 found
that the interim break'in ownership should not bar
a deduction." 7 The IRS held that "[als with the
expenditures at issue in Rev. Rul. 94-38, the costs at
issue here did not create or enhance an asset, nor
did they produce a long-term benefit.""18
Significantly, the IRS concluded the environmental
study fees were deductible under the same reason-
ing. 5 9 This issue had not previously been dealt with
by the IRS in Revenue Ruling 94-38.
C. Latent Environmental Defects
It is difficult to value property prior to the
abatement of a latent defect, such as asbestos
insulation or lead paint, because the defect most
likely was in the property when manufactured or
built. This difficulty was one reason why the IRS
declined to apply the Plainfield-Union increase-in-
value test in the first asbestos-TAM. ' 60 However,
the discovery of an unexpected defect did not
prevent the Plainfield-Union court from allowing a
deduction. Rather,.the court noted the taxpayer in
that case could not have realized at the time it
installed its tar-lined pipes that someday it would
switch from carriage of fresh water to carriage of
a more acidic river water which would result in
turberculation.' 61 The future use of acidic river
water was a state of affairs that did not exist when
the pipes were installed with a tar lining. The util-
ity company, by replacing the tar lining with
cement, was remedying a latent defect in the
pipes (tar lining) brought about by a new state of
affairs (the carriage of river water). The utility
company did not increase the value of its pipes,
nor incur a future benefit, by way of its remedy
because the pipes' carriage capacity did not
increase.
In regards to latent defects, taxpayers could
argue that new environmental regulations, and
an increased awareness of the dangers posed by
toxic substances, are a state of affairs that did
not exist when the property was in use. 62 For
example, it was not until the early 1980's that it
became generally known that asbestos fibers
156. This new Tech. Adv. Mer. has not yet been issued.
157. John S. Ross. 11. Tax Treatment of Environmental Clonup
Costs: The Debate Continues. 12 TAx MGmI. RF.L Esr. 1. 83. (April 3.
1996) (electronic version) at WL-7.
158. Silverman. Mark, et al.. IRS Remeliates Environmental
Deduction Mess. 96 TAx NorTs ToDAx 51-44. March 11. 1996. at
LEXIS*29.
159. Id.
160. Tech. Adv. Mem. 42-40-004 supra note 65.
161. 39 T.C. at 340. (-We do not find that petitioner expect-
posed a health risk. Presumably, the use of toxi-
cs during the construction or maintenance of
tangible property was unintentional. 63
Therefore, a deduction should be allowed
because the remedial expenses relate more to
this recent state of affairs than to the future. A
deduction becomes more possible in the
absence of a future benefit.
Revenue Ruling 94-38 did not discuss the
possibility of allowing a repair deduction for the
remedy of latent defects. In that ruling, the tax-
payer purchased uncontaminated land. thereby
allowing a comparison of the value of the land
before and after contamination. Therefore, the
possibility of a remediation deduction for latent
defects such as asbestos and lead paint remains
an issue.
D. Replacement of Underground Storage Tanks
and Other Facilities
Underground storage tanks ("USTs") pose a
significant remediation challenge to urban
renewal efforts. 6 4 Whether a deduction is
allowed after Revenue Ruling 94-38 for the
removal and replacement of leaking underground
storage tanks, monitoring wells, and other con-
tainment facilities is unclear.'6' The replacement
or massive repair of a UST. like the groundwater
treatment facility in Revenue Ruling 94-38.
should be capitalized because of the future ben-
efit it will provide to the taxpayer beyond the cur-
rent tax year.'" An issue also exists whether a
UST is considered a "structure under Section
280B. Section 280B disallows deductions for
demolition losses surrounding structures. 167 The
IRS, if it interprets "structure' to include USTs.
may not allow a deduction. A revenue ruling is
needed to clarify this issue. Despite these possi-
ble interpretations, note that petroleum mar-
keters were prime proponents of remediation
cost deductions for UST cleanup, and have
already won a deduction for soil remediation
costs. A further expansion of tax policy to allow
the deductibility of more of the remedial costs
surrounding USTs is possible.
ed in 1950 that there would be a need fora cement lining.-
162. Conjura. supra note 31. at WL9-10.
163. LId.
164. Sez generally U.S. E1ro=.*mLAL Noricinou Acawcy FACT
SHMT. supra note 21.
165. CCH TAX D,. Federal. August 8. 1995 (electronic ver-
sion).
166. Se Rev. Rul. 94-38. 1 CB. 35.
167. 26 I.R.C sec. 280B (West 1988).
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E. Reconciling the Expanding Scope of the
Environmental Remediation Deduction with
INDOPCO
In Revenue Ruling 94-38, the IRS narrowly inter-
prets the Supreme Court's future-benefits test,
applied in INDOPCO and initially followed by the
IRS in the first asbestos-TAM, by not taking intangi-
ble benefits into account when analyzing whether
current remediation expense leads to significant
future benefits. The INDOPCO decision recognized
that intangible benefits, in some circumstances,
result in a significant increase in the asset's value 68
These future benefits must match up with the rev-
enues of the taxable penod to which they are prop-
erly attributable in order to accurately calculate net
income for tax purposes 69 Under what circum-
stances the IRS may discount the significance of
intangible benefits, such as an increase in a proper-
ty's marketability due to remedial action, is an issue
that should be resolved by the IRS or the courts.
The current IRS interpretation of INDOPCO,
found in Revenue Ruling 94-38, is supported in the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Placid Oil v. Internal Revenue
Service 70 The Fifth Circuit held that not all of the
costs incurred as a result of a bankruptcy reorgani-
zation need to be capitalized as a result of the
INDOPCO decision.i 71 The IRS cannot ignore the
reality, however, that environmental remediation
has a value-adding effect on property valuation and
is taken into account by property appraisers and
state property tax assessment statutes. 72
The Tax Court recently acknowledged that envi-
ronmental concerns affect the value of real estate.
The court allowed a taxpayer refund because the tax
appraisal of the property in question did not reflect
its extensive environmental contamination. 73 This
effect on value was also noted in the first asbestos-
168. INDOPco, 503 U.S. at 88-89.
169. Id. at 83-84.
170. 988 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1993).
171. Id. at 558. ('The Supreme Court recently reiterated that
the 'decisive distinctions' between current expenses and capital
expenditures are 'those of degree and not kind' [thus] the
Bankruptcy Court should consider a mix of factors "(quoting
INDOPCO. 503 U.S. at 86)).
172. The increase in value attributable to environmental
remediation was recently termed an 'addition' under Michigan's
property tax assessment Act 42. Michigan - Property Tax: Vanous
Definitions Amended, CCH TAX DAY: State. July 20. 1995 (electronic
version): also. Texas statute Ch. 43 now requires its state apprais-
ers take into account the value-reducing impact of environmental
response requirements, which necessarily requires them to take
into account the value-adding impact of the satisfaction of such
requirements. See Texas - Property Tax: Environmental Response Costs
Affect Market ValueAppraisal. CCH TAX DAY: State, Sept. 8, 1993.
173. See Necastro Est. v. Commissioner. T.C.M. (CCH) 94.352
(1994).
TAM. The IRS noted that modifications made to
bring property into compliance with local regula-
tions increase the value of the affected property.
74
Therefore, whether the increasing scope of environ-
mental deductions allowed under the Tax Code
comports with the matching principle espoused by
the Supreme Court in INDOPCO remains an issue.
VI. Conclusion
Revenue Ruling 94-38 demonstrates IRS will-
ingness to allow deductions of some environmental
remediation expenses as ordinary and business
expenses under IRC Section 162. Robert Kilinskis,
attorney-advisor in the Office of Tax Policy,
remarked, "[algents were capitalizing and taxpayers
were deducting. We think everyone gets what they
want with 94-38."175 Yet, the TAMs serve as a cau-
tionary note to the taxpayer that many unresolved
issues remain. The IRS has been urged to issue
more revenue rulings to further clarify its policy.
Until then, taxpayers should consider whether, in
light of Revenue Ruling 94-38, they should be capi-
talizing all of their remediation expenses.
Moreover, recently proposed legislation may
significantly change the treatment of environmental
remediation deductions within the Internal
Revenue Code itself. Senator Coyne of Pennsylvania
has proposed an amendment to the IRC to allow a
credit for the cleanup of qualified contaminated
industrial sites. 76 The proposed legislation, termed
"The Brownfields Redevelopment Acl of 1996," rec-
ognizes that contaminated property located in
urban communities poses health problems, reduces
the value of property, and deters investment within
those communities. Another proposed amendment
to the IRC, introduced by Senator Abraham of
174. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 supra note 65, citing
Teitelbaum v. commissioner. 294 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1961) cert.
denred, 368 U.S. 987 (1965): RKO Theaters, Inc, v, United States,
163 F. Supp. 598 (Ct. CI. 1958); Hotel Sulgrave, Inc. v.
Commissioner 21 T.C. 619 (1954): Beaven v. Commissioner, 6
T.C.M. 1344 (1943).
175. CCH TAx DAY: Federal, June 9. 1994 (electronic version).
176. The bill reads in part:
(a) General Rule. For purposes of section 38, the envi-
ronmental remediation credit determined under this
section is 50 percent of the costs
[I) which are paid or incurred by the taxpiyer for envi-
ronmental remediation.with respect to any qualified
contaminated site which is owned by the taxpayer, and
(2) which are incurred by the taxpayer pursuant to an
environmental remediation plan for the site which was
approved by the Administrator of the Eivironmental
Protection Agency or by the head of State or local gov-
ernment agency designated by the Admini .trator
H.R. 2846, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
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Michigan, would permit a deduction for certain
environmental remediation expenses that occur
within the distressed urban communities that
Congress has designated "empowerment zones"
and "enterprise communities."177 Most significantly.
the Clinton Administration has also proposed simi-
lar changes to the I.R.C.178 The Administration
hopes the estimated $2 billion tax incentive will
produce $10 billion in private cleanup invest-
ment.7 9 This flurry of legislation indicates that the
government's attitude towards the environmental
remediation deduction is undergoing a dramatic
change. A broader application of the Plainfie/d-Unwn
test by the IRS should be expected.
The effectiveness of achieving environmental
goals through tax deductions is an unresolved
issue. Proponents of the environmental remedia-
tion deduction rely on long-standing and widely-
accepted tax accounting principles. Opponents to
the use of the tax code as a means of bettering the
urban environment also rely on convincing policy
concerns. A focus on the IRS's divergent approach
to the future benefits test outlined in INDOPCO
should raise an interesting and perhaps effective
challenge to the efforts of industry to broaden the
applicability of the environmental remediation
deduction. In the final analysis, however, the cur-
rent attentiveness paid by Congress. industry and
some environmentalists to the environmental
remediation deduction ensures its viability as a tool
to be used by either business or environmental
advocates in the urban environmental setting.
177- The bill reads in part:
(a) Treatment as Expense. A taxpayer may elect to treat
any environmental remediation cost as an expense
which is not chargeable to capital account. Any cost so
treated shall be allowable as a deduction for the taxable
year in which the cost is paid or incurred.
(b)Environmental Remediation Cost. For purposes of
this section-
(1) In general. The term 'environmental remediation
cost' means any cost which-
(A) is chargeable to capital account
(B) is paid or incurred in connection with the abatement
or control of environmental contaminants at a site locat-
ed within an empowerment zone or enterprise commu-
nity."
S. 1542, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
178. An amendment to Part Vi of subchapter B of chapter I
of the Internal Revenue Code will read:
(a) -in General. A taxpayer may elect to treat any qualified
environmental remediation expenditure which is paid or incurred
by the taxpayer as an expense which is not chargeable to capital
account. Any expenditure which Is so treated shall be allowed as
a deduction for the taxable year in which it is paid or incurred.
(cliA) In general. The term *qualified contaminated site
means any area-
(I) which Is held by the taxpayer for use in a trade or
business or for the production of income, or which is
property described insection 1221(l) in the handsof the
taxpayer. (i) which Is within a targeted area, and (iii)
which contains (or potentially contains) any hazardous
substance.
(B) Taxpayer must receive a statement from State envi-
ronmental agency.
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